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Abstract:  The purpose of this paper is to document and analyze the immediate economic 
impact of the Indian Ocean tsunami generated by the Sumatra-Andaman earthquake of 26 
December 2004 and the disaster management process in the immediate aftermath of the disaster 
with a focus on the two worst affected countries – Indonesia (Aceh province) and Sri Lanka.   
The 26 December Tsunami is unique among large disasters in recorded human history, not only 
because of the sheer number of causalities and massive displacement of people, but also because 
of the unprecedented international donor response and the logistic challenges faced by 
international organizations and aid agencies in organizing and coordinating relief efforts.  Our 
preliminary findings points to the importance of educating the public about simple precautions in 
the event of a disaster and enforcement of coastal environmental regulations as disaster 
prevention policies. The findings also makes a strong case for designing policies and programs, as 
an integral part of national development strategy, for mitigating the impact of natural disasters on 
the poor and highlights the need for combining international aid commitments with innovative 
approaches to redressing problems of limited aid absorptive capacity in disaster affected 
countries.  
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The Indian Ocean Tsunami: 
Economic Impact, Disaster Management and Lessons∗
 
 
 
Sociologist, psychologists, historians, and policy planners have all devoted considerable 
attention to the nature, sources, and consequences of disaster and recovery, but the 
professional economic literature is distressingly sparse.  …Yet disasters are natural economic 
experiments; they parallel the tests to destruction from which engineers and physicist learn 
about the strength of material and machines.  Much light would be thrown upon the normal 
everyday economy if we understood behaviour under conditions of great stress.  
Jack Hirshleifer 1993 
 
1. Introduction 
With a death toll of about 350 thousand, the Indian Ocean tsunami caused by the deep-
sea earthquake near northern Sumatra on 26 December 2004 is by far the worst natural 
disaster of that kind in the recoded human history. 1   Quite apart from the sheer number 
of deaths, the Indian Ocean tsunami has at least two unique features, which make it a 
valuable laboratory for the study of disaster management issues in the new millennium.  
First, it is the world’s first truly global disaster, with lives shattered in a dozen of 
countries in two different continents.  Second, the response to the disaster has also been 
global in a way rarely seen before, with tens of millions of ordinary citizens reaching into 
their pockets to send aid, in addition to donor governments and agencies.  In some donor 
nations such as the UK, USA, Italy and Germany private donations surpassed the sizable 
government aid commitments and for the first time corporate donors figured prominently 
among private donors. 
 
                                                 
∗ Revised of a papers presented at the Asian Economic Panel Conference, Keio University, Tokyo, 6 – 7 
March 2005.   The authors are grateful to Jeffrey Sachs, Wing Thy Woo, Chalongphob Sussangkarn and 
other conference participants for helpful comments.   The first author would like to thank the Institute of 
Policy Studies, Colombo and its Executive Director, Dr Saman Kelegama for invaluable institutional 
support for undertaking the Sri Lankan case study. 
1  The death toll reported here Includes unaccounted (missing) people (142 thousand).  The five previous 
deadliest tsunami (with the death toll in bracket) are:  Indonesia: 27 August 1883  (36,000), Portugal: 1 
November 1755  (30,000), Japan: 15 June 1896 (27,000); Japan: 21 May 1792 (14,000), and Japan: 27 
March 1933 (3,000) (Abbott, 2004, Table 3.7). 
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The first feature, the vast geographic spread of the disaster, produced a huge logistic 
challenge for international organizations and aid agencies.  It also rekindled international 
interest is in setting up a global disaster monitoring system and other cooperative 
initiatives to increasing public awareness of calamities of this nature at the global and 
regional level.  The second feature, massive tsunami aid flows, has drawn attention to a 
number of new issues of international aid operations, including avoiding duplication of 
tasks, setting up procedures for translating aid pledges into actual aid flows and finding 
ways and means of avoiding untoward effects of massive aid inflows in an unplanned 
fashion to the affected countries.   The unprecedented preference shown by individual 
donors to informal private channels has thrown into sharper relief the veining public 
confidence in aid organizations and receiving-country governments.  In addition, the 
devastation caused by the tsunami has begun to reveal a close connection between the 
magnitude of the damage caused by the killer waves and the violation of environmental 
regulations in the affected countries.  Although the height of the waves and their global 
spread were purely the work of nature, there is clear evidence that the sheer number of 
losses of human lives was partly a result of modern progress, ruthless destruction of 
natural defenses such as coral forests and mangrove swamps, and building oceanfront 
hotels and villas in violation of coastal conservation legislation.    
 
The purpose this paper is to document the nature and extent of the disaster, and to 
undertake a preliminary analysis of the economic impact and disaster management 
process in the immediate aftermaths of the disaster, in order to set the stage for deeper 
analysis of these and related issues.  The paper is arranged in three main sections.  It 
begins with a broad-brush picture of the tsunami disaster – the nature and extent of the 
calamity and the international donor response – from a comparative perspective.  The 
next two sections contain case studies of the two worst affected countries – Indonesia 
(Aceh province) and Sri Lanka.  The case studies follow a common format, focusing in 
turn on the history of natural dissenters and the preparedness (or rather lack of it) for 
facing them, the economic impact of the tsunami and the crisis management experience 
to date.  The final section summarizes the key findings and policy lessons. 
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2. The Indian Ocean Tsunami: An Overview 
On 26 December at 0059 GMT (just before 8 am local time) an earthquake measuring 9.0 
on the Richter scale occurred about 30 km off the west coast of Sumatra, the extreme 
western end of the ‘Ring of Fire’ (a zone of frequent volcanic eruption partly encircling 
the Pacific Basin that accounts for over 80 percent of the world’s largest earthquakes).  
This was the fifth largest earthquake for a century and the largest after the one erupted in 
Prince William Sound in Alaska in 1964 (9.2 on the Richter scale).  It ruptured about 
1300 km of the fault boundary between the Indo-Australian Plate under the southeastern 
Eurasian plate, slipping the former under the latter and lifting the seabed by as much as 
by 5 meters (16 feet).  The initial energy released by the eruption was estimated at about 
25 Hiroshima bombs (Lay et al. 2005).  
 
The tsunami split about 8 minutes after the rupture, sending energy pulses east towards 
the Sumatra coast and west across the open seas in the Bay of Bengal at a speed up to 800 
km an hour (the speed of a modern jet plane at full throttle).  The eastward-moving wave 
traveled through first, pulling water away from shores.  So the westward, long-distance 
tsunami processed crest first.   The height of the leading tsunami wave increased to as 
much as 24.4 meters as it approached in 28 minutes the shallow waters of the Aceh 
province of Sumatra (National Geographic, 2005).   Meanwhile the long-distance tsunami 
widened its arc as it continued west, affecting coastal areas of Thailand, Myanmar, India 
(Tamil Nadu, and Andaman and Nicobar Islands), Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, 
Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania (See Map 1).   
 
The Aceh province, the land mass closest to the east of the epicenter of the earthquake, 
had to bear the full brunt.  Sri Lanka was the next worst affected because there was no 
landmass between it and the epicenter to cushion the coastlines in the north, east and the 
south.  The fault line of the earthquake was in a north-south orientation.  The great 
strength of the long-distance tsunami was therefore in east-west direction.  This explains 
why Bangladesh, which lies on the northern end of the Bay of Bengal, had very few 
casualties despite being a low-lying country regularly devastated by cyclones and why 
Somalia was hit harder than Bangladesh despite being far away from the epicenter.  The 
 5
physical oceanography of the Indian Ocean during the month of December also seems to 
have played a role in determining the path and the severity of the tsunami waves.  In the 
month of December under the North East Monsoon the equatorial Indian Ocean jet 
propagates along the equator from Sumatra (near the epicenter of the earthquake) slightly 
to the South of Sri Lanka and to Somalia.  This was perhaps an additional reason why the 
impact of the waves was so severe in Sri Lanka, the Indian state of Kerala was badly hit 
despite the cover provided by the landmass of Sri Lanka, and the impact on Somalia (and 
also Kenya and Tanzania) was disproportionate to the long distance from the epicenter.   
 
Map 1 about here 
 
The Pacific Tsunami Monitoring Centre (PTMC) in Honolulu, Hawaii2 detected the 
earthquake 18 minutes after the eruption and issued an e-mail communiqué to the Pacific-
nation member countries saying that there was no threat to them.  A second communiqué 
indicated the possibility of a tsunami affecting countries in the Indian Ocean Sixty-five 
minutes later.  This information was, however, not communicated to the countries in the 
Indian Ocean region, as the PTMC officials did not have required contracts in their 
address book.  There was no warning system in place in the Indian Ocean.  Even if the 
information were made available, it would not have made a big difference because these 
countries had no effective civil defense mechanism for getting the information to the 
people.   Moreover, unlike in the Pacific Ocean, tsunami has been a very rare occurrence 
in the Indian Ocean and historically tsunami-related calamities had been of minor 
importance compared to other natural disasters (Abbott, 2004, Ch. 3; Albala-Bertrand 
1993, Ch. 2).   
 
The 26 December tsunami was first and foremost a human tragedy.  Total official death 
toll had passed the 220 marked by mid February 2005, with over 50 thousand people still 
                                                 
2 The International Tsunami Warning System was first established as part of the US Government’s national 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration  following the disaster caused by the tsunami of April 1, 1946 in 
the Hawaiian Islands.  The coverage of the system was extended to military bases throughout the Pacific 
and to islands in the Trust Territories.  Beginning in October 1953, warning information was extended to 
California, Oregon and the State of Washington.  A large number of countries joined the system after the 
May 1960 Chilean tsunami and the tsunami generated by the great Alaskan earthquake of 1964. 
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missing (presumably also dead) (Table 1).  The Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan 
described the catastrophe as ‘the largest natural disaster the organization has had to 
respond on behalf of the world community in the 60 years of our existence’.  The 
macroeconomic impact on Indonesia, India and Thailand is unlikely to be severe 
compared to the shocking human toll.  Despite the misery, the impact on regional GDP 
growth rate in 2005 is likely to be modest. However, by virtue of its economic sizes, the 
immediate and medium-term impact on economic growth is proportionately much greater 
in Sri Lanka and Maldives than in Thailand, Indonesia and India. The region’s financial 
markets remained ‘strangely serene’ (EIU 2005, p. 1).  Currencies have not been 
collapsed, and in Sri Lanka massive aid commitments triggered a significant appreciation 
of the nominal exchange rate (see below).   The main reason for the limited economic 
impact was that the tsunami missed the industrial and commercial centres of all affected 
countries other than Maldives.  The impact on the global financial market was rather 
muted because many of the damaged facilities were uninsured, minimizing the exposure 
of Western and Asian financial services companies to the tsunami destruction.3  Massive 
aid pledges also played a crucial cushioning role in maintaining business confidence in 
the affected countries, in addition, of course, to facilitating relief operations in the 
aftermaths of the devastation. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The donor response to the tsunami crisis has been unprecedented.  According to records 
maintained by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA) of the 
United Nations, 78 countries, thirty organizations and individual donors had pledged US$ 
6.3 billion by 21 February 2005 (Table 2).  In addition, there were unprecedented direct 
private contributions, which according to some estimates amounted to more than 1.6 
billion.4  In some donor countries such as the UK, USA and Italy private contributions 
exceeded the sizable government contributions by a wider margin.  When the total 
                                                 
3 Munich Re estimated that its total exposure will be less than Eoru 100m (US$ 13mn), while Swiss Re, the 
world’s second largest insurer, said its exposure should be under US$88mn (EIU 2005). 
4 This estimate is based on Chandler 2005; Economist 2005c, and information obtained from 
www.lanklibrary.com (based on Reuters reports). 
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official aid pledges and private donations (individual and corporate) are taken together 
(about US$ 8 billion) and relates to an estimated number of around 5 million people 
directly affected by the disaster (Table 1), per head aid contribution turns out to be over 
US$ 1000.  The norm in previous international fund raising attempts in face of natural 
disasters has been a mere US$40 per head (Economist 2005d).   
 
Table 2 about here 
 
In addition to direct aid pledges, the Paris Club of creditor nations declared at its January 
12 meeting in Paris a moratorium on the foreign debt of the tsunami hit countries.5  Some 
key players of the international aid community, including the World Bank president 
James Wolfensohn, suggested that debt write-offs would be preferable to debt deferral.  
However, this proposal was not accepted because it raised the so-called ‘moral hazard’ 
problem; countries absolved of debt might borrow excessively or recklessly in future in 
the expectation that they would eventually be bailed-out. The IMF and World Bank 
officially endorsed the moratorium and the major international credit rating agencies 
declared that they would not take into account deferral of debt service payments as a 
negative factor in their risk assessment and credit rating.  Subsequently, the IMF and the 
World Bank also announced considerable debt relief for the affected countries, in 
particular for the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Indonesia.  In February 2005, the Asian 
Development Bank set up a US$600 million Asian Tsunami Fund to deliver grants for 
emergency technical assistance and reconstruction projects.   
 
 
 
                                                 
5 It is important to note that countries that choose to accept a debt moratorium would face larger 
repayments- a debt ‘hump’ – in the future years.  A suspension of debt payments could carry other risks as 
well.  Any suspension of debt payments might cause lenders to question the creditworthiness of borrowers 
(although the major credit rating agencies have declared that they would not downgrade tsunami-affected 
countries that accepted debt deferral). Countries that accepted debt deferral might also raise concerns 
among investors, who may worry if governments opt for a bail-out rather than face up to difficult economic 
decisions. 
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4. Indonesia  
 
(a)  A Historical Perspective of Natural Disasters 
Located in the “Ring of Fire”, Indonesia has the largest number of active volcanoes in the 
world.  Approximately 10 percent of the world’s recorded seismic activity had occurs in 
the Indonesian archipelago (Tomascik et al. 1997).6  There are hundreds of volcanoes in 
the country, of which approximately 76 percent have been historically active.  The 
majority of these are located in the arc of Sumatra, Java and the Lesser Sunda Islands.  
There have been around 1,171 recorded volcanic eruptions in Indonesia, a record which 
only slightly lower than that of Japan (1,274).  These two countries jointly account for 
1/3 of the known eruptions in the world, but Indonesia has suffered the highest numbers 
of fatalities, damage to arable land, mudflows, tsunamis, domes, and pyroclastic flows. 
Four fifths of Indonesia’s dated volcanic eruptions have occurred in this century (USGS, 
2003).  Two of these eruptions are among the largest eruption ever in the world. 
 
The contour and climate of the Indonesian archipelago also has the potential to cause 
other deadly natural disasters such as cyclone, drought and flood.   According to records 
maintained by the WHO Collaborating Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters (CRED) at the Universite Catholique de Louvain, during the period from 1907 
to 2004, there were approximately 312 events of deadly natural disaster in Indonesia, 
averaging to around 3 disaster per year (Table 3).  On average, approximately 976 people 
died and approximately 51 thousand people affected per event.  The Indonesian 
Emergency Relief Coordination Agency (Bakornas PBP) recorded that during 1997- 
2004 there were 796 cases of natural disasters (excluding the 26 December disaster), on 
average 99 cases per year or more than one each week (Table 4).  These events killed 
approximately 37 thousand people, created 460 thousand refugees, and destroyed 68 
thousand houses.   The average (per-event) death toll of tsunami amounted to 960, 
compared to 140 relating to earthquakes and 37 relating to cyclones.   
                                                 
6  This number is certainly big but much smaller compared to China. Forty percent of world earthquakes 
happened in China. 
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Table 3 about here 
Table 4 about here 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Figure 1 depicts the number of occurrences and magnitudes of earthquake (with 
magnitude equal and greater than 5 on the Richter scale) in Indonesia since 1907.   
Interestingly, both the frequency and the magnitude of earthquakes has been increasing 
throughout this period.  The most severe natural disasters occurred in the country are as 
follows.   
 
• Eruption of the Tambora volcano in the Sumbawa Island, West Nusa Tenggara 
(1815).  This was the greatest volcanic eruption in recorded history (VEI=7).7  During 
this eruption, Tambora’s cone with an estimated volume of 30 km3 was blown away 
and the total material erupted was approximately 100-300 km3.  Ash of this eruption 
was found up to 600 km in the Indian Ocean toward the south but not toward the 
north. Ash layers with a thickness of 60 cm were found at a distance of 70 km.  This 
eruption killed approximately 92 thousand people.  The tremendous amounts of ash 
thrown into the atmosphere resulted in an abnormally cold summer in the Northern 
Hemisphere (Tomascik et al. 1997). 
 
• Eruption of the Krakatoa volcanic island located in Sunda strait between Java and 
Sumatra islands (1883).  This eruption was the fourth greatest volcano eruption in 
recorded history.  It emitted approximately 18 km2 of ash.  The coast of Java and 
Sumatra were hit by at least 19 tsunamis, with the largest estimated at 30-40 m high.  
The clouds of dust, gases, and debris rose approximately 27 km into the atmosphere, 
coloring sunsets for 2 years.  The total death toll was approximately 36 thousand 
(Tomascik et al. 1997, Winchester 2003). 
                                                 
7  The volcanic explocivity index.  Eruptions with VEI equal and greater than 4 are considered large 
eruptions.  An eruption with VEI equals 4 happens once a year (around the world). An eruption with VEI 
equals 5 or 6 happens once every around 100 years. An eruption with VEI equals 7 happens once every 
around 1000 years. 
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• Eruption of Kelut volcano located in the East Java, not so far from relatively 
populated towns of Kediri and Blitar. This volcano has erupted several times and two 
eruptions have caused fatalities. First eruption (VEI = 5) was in 1586. It produced one 
of the worst lahar in historical record of volcanic eruptions and took the lives of about 
10 thousand people. Second (VEI=4) was in 1919.  In this case, lahars traveled as far 
as 38 km in less than an hour and devastated an area of more than 15 thousand 
hectares of arable land, destroying hundred villages and killing approximately 5 
thousand people (Bergen et al. 2000). 
 
• Earthquake occurred in Bali on the 21st of January 1917 (NGDC 2004).  This 
earthquake (6.5 on the Richter scale) and the resultant tsunami together destroyed 
more than thousand houses in the island.  Around 15 thousand people died during this 
event.  The death toll could have been much higher if it were not for the particular 
timing of the earthquake; it occurred in the morning when most people were already 
up and working in the rice fields.  This is among the 25 deadliest earthquakes in the 
world so far. 
 
• Earthquake and tsunami occurred on the Island of Flores (12th of December 1992).  
This earthquake (measured at 7.5 on the Richter scale) generated tsunami waves as 
high as 25 meters, which penetrated 300 meters inland, killing approximately 2,500 
people, leaving around 90,000 were left homeless. Between 50 to 80 percent of 
houses and structures on the island were damaged or destroyed.  There were also 
reported damages in surrounding islands such as Sumba and Alor (NGDC 2004).  
 
• The two most severe droughts took place in 1966 and in 1997.  The drought in 1966 
killed approximately 8 thousand people and put approximately 204 thousand people 
in starvation, mostly in the island of Lombok (CRED 2005).  An extreme El Nino in 
the Pacific caused the drought in 1997. Ocean surface temperatures were much 
warmer than normal in the east and cooler than usual near Indonesia, shifting rain 
away from Indonesia (Wheeler 2002). The drought killed approximately 5 hundred 
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people and starved around 90 thousand people, mostly in Papua.  The situation got 
worst since this drought induced forest fires destroying around 9.7 million ha forest 
resources and wild life habitat across the country, mostly in Kalimantan and Sumatra.  
The smoke haze affected millions of people in the region, including in Singapore, 
Malaysia and Thailand.  Conservative estimates of the economic loss that occurred 
for Indonesia was over US$ 4 billion (Applegate et al. 2002, Wheeler 2002, Glover 
and Jessup 1999)  
 
In sum, Indonesia has been the victim of some of the worst natural disasters in the world. 
Moreover, there are clear indications that the frequency of natural disasters in Indonesia 
has been increasing over time.   
 
(b)  The 26 December Earthquake and Tsunami  
The earthquake and tsunami on the 26th of December 2004 is the worst natural disaster in 
Indonesian history.  Most people in Aceh and North Sumatra, and several regions in 
Indonesia, could feel the shake caused by the massive eruption that occurred at about 8 
am that day.  About 15 minutes later, tsunami hit the northern part of Aceh, the western 
part Aceh and North Sumatra as well as islands in those regions such as Nias and 
Simeulue islands.  Waves as high as 10 m high and a speed of around 800 km per hour hit 
the city of Banda Aceh, which is located in the northern part of Aceh.  In some places, 
waves went inland approximately 7.5 km from the coastline. Waves as high as 12 m hit 
cities of Meulaboh, Calang and Lamno – cities located in the western part of Aceh –and 
they submerged areas up to about 10 km from the coastline (Soehaimi et al. 2005). 
 
By mid March 2005, the official Tsunami death toll in Indonesia was close to 167 
thousand, with 128 thousand missing (most likely dead), and 648 thousand displaced 
(Table 1).  According to figures released by the Department of Social Affairs on the 17th 
of February 2005, around 920 people were in hospitals, and around 480 thousand people 
in refugee camps (Table 5).    In term of number of people killed and missing, the city of 
Banda Aceh suffered the most; followed by the districts of Aceh Jaya and Aceh Barat. In 
term of percentage of population affected, Aceh Barat district suffered the most, followed 
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by the city of Banda Aceh, Aceh Jaya and Aceh Besar in that order.  The impact of the 
earthquake and tsunami is concentrated in these four districts.   
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Based on field visits and interviews in Aceh during and several weeks after the disaster, 
Aspinall finds that children, women and older people accounted for more than two thirds 
of the tsunami victims, dramatically changing the demographic structures in many 
villages and cities heavily hit by the tsunami.8   Unlike in Sri Lanka (see below), the 
death toll was much higher than the number of people hospitalized or became homeless.    
 
An interesting case worth noting is the rather low death toll in Simeulue island, which is 
situated only about 100 km away from the epicenter.  Simeulue Island was severely hit by 
the tsunami; approximately 5,500 houses were destroyed and hundreds of people suffered 
injury.   However, only seven deaths were recorded (Kompas, 1 April 2005).  There are 
two possible reasons for the surprisingly low death toll.   First, the coastal ecosystem, 
namely the coral reef, sea grass and mangrove forests in the northern part of the island 
softened the force of the giant waves. Second, local culture  in the island (adat) has an 
important precautionary procedure transferred from generations to generations for facing 
a tsunami. The procedure is as follows.  Once one recognizes some indications of an 
impending tsunami, he/she would runs to the closest hill shouting 
‘smong….smong…..smong’ (tsunami in local language).  Others who hear the warning 
would run to the closest hill while contributing to the ‘smong….smong…..smong’ chorus.  
This simple procedure proved to be very effective in the recent tsunami (Wetlands 
International-Indonesia Program 2005). Unlike in Simeulue, simple traditional mitigation 
procedures imbedded in local culture have never existed or had simply been forgotten by 
the people in other areas in Aceh and North Sumatra. 
 
Evidence of the importance of the coastal ecosystem in mitigating the impact of tsunami 
comes from the other affected areas in Indonesia as well.   For instance, the impact of the 
                                                 
8  Based on a discussion with Edward Aspinall, University of Sydney.  
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tsunami was less severe in areas along the west and east coast of Aceh, where the coastal 
ecosystem remained in relatively good shape.   The damage was much severe in coastal 
cities, where the coastal ecosystem has been disturbed by housing, tourism and 
destructive fishing, were affected more than other areas (Wetlands International-
Indonesia Program 2005).   
 
 There are several agencies in Indonesia that have the responsible to monitor seismic 
activities and other natural disasters in the country, such as the Meteorology and 
Geophysics Agency (Badan Meteorologi dan Geofisika), Volcano and Geological 
Disaster Mitigation Directorate (Direktorat Vulkanologi dan Mitigasi Bencana Geologi) 
at the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, and Center of Geological Research and 
Development (Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Geologi).  Since the Flores tsunami in 
1992, these agencies, with the help of international institutions, have been conducting 
research on tsunami in Indonesia.  Banyuwangi tsunami in 1994 and Biak tsunami in 
1996 further encouraged such research.  A few years ago, these agencies jointly produced 
a map indicating where tsunami events are most likely to occur.  This initial work did not 
lead to the development of a systematic and comprehensive tsunami monitoring system 
because of unavailability of funding.  However, even if such system existed, it may not 
have made a much of a difference in the recent tsunami; the epicenter of the earthquake 
was too close to Aceh and massive reached the land in fifteen minutes (Deutsche Presse-
Agentur 4 January 2005). 
 
(c )  The Economic Impact 
 
The World Bank, using a standard assessment technique developed by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC 2003), has 
estimated the total damages and losses caused by the earthquake and tsunami was 
approximately US$ 4.45 billion or almost 100 percent of Aceh’s GDP in 2003 (Table 6). 
Of the total, 60 percent constitutes damages, while 40 percent constitutes losses in the 
term of income flows lost to the economy. Around 78 percent of the total damages and 
losses were born by the private sector and the rest by the public sector (World Bank, 
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2005).  The Institute for Economic and Social Research (LPEM) at the Faculty of 
Economics-University of Indonesia estimated the total damage in Aceh at US$ 4.6 billion 
(LPEM 2005).  According to LPEM estimates, around a third of the road network, 
schools and hospitals were destroyed by the tsunami (see Table 7).  According to 
estimates by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) the giant waves flattened some 
115,000 houses and severely damaged another 150,000 (ADB 2005, p. 11)   
 
Table 6 about here 
Table 7 about here 
 
Aceh’s GDP in 2003 was approximately US$ 4.5 billion, approximately 2.3 percent of 
total GDP of the national economy. Oil and gas industry and agriculture were two sectors 
that dominated Aceh’s economy, contributing for 43 percent and 32.2 percent of the 
regional GDP, respectively. In agriculture, livestock (10 percent) and food crops (10 
percent) contribute the highest share. The oil and gas industry escaped the tsunami 
virtually unharmed. The mostly affected sector is the agriculture, particularly fishery, 
both in terms of the number of casualties and capital destroyed (Soesastro and Ace 2005).   
According to the World Bank, Aceh’s GDP could contract by 7 percent to 28 percent 
compared to the 2004 level (World Bank 2005). LPEM has come up with a slightly lower 
estimate of GDP contraction, 22.3 percent (LPEM 2005).  The tsunami destruction in the 
province of North Sumatra was by and large concentrated in the district of Nias, the 
poorest district in the province whose contribution to the overall regional economy is 
rather small  (Table 5).  
 
According to information gathered by the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries,  by 
mid January approximately 55 thousand fishermen and aquaculture workers were among 
the death (approximately a half of total fishermen in Aceh), while around 14 thousand 
fishermen and aquaculture worker were still missing.  FAO (2005) reported that 40 to 60 
percent of coastal aquaculture ponds along the coast of Aceh and between 36 thousand 
and 48 thousand ha of brackish water aquaculture ponds (that mainly produced shrimp 
and milkfish) were seriously damaged.  It is estimated that about 65-70 percent of the 
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small scale fishing fleet and associated gear was destroyed in Aceh, representing 
approximately 9,500 units, of which 40 percent canoes, 25 percent with outboard motor, 
and 35 percent with diesel inboard motor.   
 
In Aceh about 30 thousand hectares of rice fields, amounting to about 10 percent of the 
total area under rice cultivation in the province were badly affected. Soil salinity 
problems were the main concern. Fortunately, due to the humid conditions in the region, 
salt-polluted arable land has been cleaned by rainfall and irrigation.  Recent survey 
carried out by FAO show that salt deposited in more than two thirds of the affected 
agricultural land has been leached out already allowing planting to resume with the 
beginning of the cropping season in April and May.  Only approximately 9 thousand ha 
can no longer be used for farming (China View 31 March 2005). 
 
According to data for 2000 approximately 8 percent of Aceh’s output exported to other 
regions in Indonesia, 26 percent of its output exported abroad, and 66 percent of its 
output was consumed within the province.  Meanwhile, import from other regions in 
Indonesia and import from abroad were only 6 percent and 4 percent, respectively, of the 
total material inputs needed for Aceh’s production sectors.  Therefore, the impact of 
decline in Aceh’s GDP on Indonesia’s overall economic performance is expected to be 
small.  The World Bank estimated that GDP growth Indonesia in 2005 would be between 
0.1 percent and 0.4 percent lower the pre-tsunami growth forecast (World Bank 2005). 
LPEM has come up with a slightly higher estimate of growth contraction (0. 56 percent) 
(LPEM 2005). 
 
Before the tsunami devastation, the Ministry for the Development of Least Developed 
Regions had classified 11 districts in Aceh (around 50 percent of the province) as least 
developed districts.  Over the past five years prior to the disaster, Aceh had been 
experiencing socio-political instability and economic disruption because of the escalation 
of the 29-year-old secessionist rebellion of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).   About 
900 schools had been destroyed or damaged and school attendance had dramatically 
declined. Meanwhile, health cares had become less accessible because people were afraid 
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to visit health facilities for security reason (Soesastro and Ace 2005, World Bank 2005).  
In 2002, the Indonesian Central Agency of Statistics calculated that around 30 percent of 
people in Aceh were living below the poverty line.  LPEM predicted the percentage of 
people in Aceh living under poverty line could increase to around 50 percent after the 
earthquake and tsunami (LPEM 2005).  Increase in poverty is probably the most serious 
economic problem caused by the earthquake and tsunami. 
 
The average rate of inflation in Banda Aceh in January 2005 was 7.02 percent, while for 
the whole country it was only 1.43 percent.  The highest rates of inflation were for 
processed food and food products - 19.26 percent and 11.24 percent, respectively 
(compared to national figures of 0.80 percent and 3.11 percent, respectively). House rents 
are also increasing rapidly. Meanwhile, January 2005 inflation in North Sumatra was 
around 2.82 percent, with food price increasing by 5.84 percent as the largest contributing 
factor (CEIC Asia Database, 21 February 2005).  There are reports that large presence of 
donors and NGOs is the main reason for these price increases (in particular increase in 
housing rent).  
 
(d)  Disaster Management 
 
The government response to a large natural disaster essentially involves three phases: (1) 
emergency and rescue operations, (2) rehabilitation of basic socio-economic 
infrastructure, and law and order, and (3) rebuilding the economy and governmental 
system.    Given the peculiar economic and political conditions of Aceh and the sheer 
magnitude of the devastation and destruction of infrastructure, the first phase of crisis 
management has taken a much longer time in Indonesia compared to Sri Lanka (see 
below).    The conflict between the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian government 
had adversely affected economic development of the province and severely constrained 
the dissemination of information on Aceh not only to the rest of the world but also to 
other parts of Indonesia. Most Indonesians and the world knew how bad the tsunami had 
hit Aceh only by the 28th of December 2004, while they had news on the impact of 
tsunami in Sri Lanka and Thailand immediately after the devastation. Furthermore poor 
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road network and telecommunication made it difficult to reach many villages along the 
coast of Aceh to provide emergency rescue activities. 
 
The government embarked on the second phase in April 2005 and this is expected to take 
around two years.  The third phase will involve around five more years.  The Indonesian 
National Planning and Development Agency (Bappenas) has taken initiatives to develop 
blueprints for the second and third phases.   According to estimates prepared by the Asian 
Development Bank, reconstruction will need US$1.5 billion in 2005 and up to US$5 
billion over the next five years.  The cost of housing rehabilitation/reconstruction alone is 
estimated at US$573 million.  Funding is expected to come largely from international 
sources. 
 
International donor response has been remarkably quick and overwhelming. By mid 
February, approximately 34 countries and various organizations had made pledges and 
commitments to support various emergency relief, rehabilitation and re-constructions in 
Aceh and North Sumatra.  So far, the total pledges and commitments that specifically 
targeted to Indonesia has been around US$ 800 million (Table 2).  It is important to note 
that this figure does not include various soft loans for the reconstruction of Aceh and 
North Sumatra.  For example Australia has agreed to provide soft loans amounting to 500 
million AUD throughout the next 5 years.  Table 2 also does not include the value of debt 
moratorium or debt swap offered by several countries such as Germany, France and Italy.  
In the Consultative Group Meeting for Indonesia (CGI) meeting conducted on the 19th 
and 20th of January 2005, CGI members agreed to contribute as much as US$ 1.7 billion 
in 2005 for the re-construction of Aceh. Of this amount US$ 1.2 billion will be in the 
form of grants and the remaining US$ 0.5 billion in the form of project loans on very soft 
terms (zero or near zero interest). Of the US$ 1.2 billion grants, only US$ 0.2 billion will 
be distributed through the Indonesian government. The rest will be distributed through 
non-governmental organizations (Soesastro and Ace, 2005).  
 
Implementation of the second stage of the crisis management process has so far been 
much slower than proposed in various government policy declarations.  Housing 
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rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced people; restoration of basic utilities had 
hardly begun even by mid May 2005, let alone rehabilitation/reconstruction of roads and 
bridges (ADB 2005, Economist 2005e). Over 90 percent of displaced people were still in 
rehabilitation camps and/or temporary shelters.  Individual agencies were making some 
progress in resettlement of affected people and clearing roads along the devastated west 
coast of Aceh, but the central government had not yet come up with a strategy to co-
ordinate these activities.   The role of the local (provincial) government is hampered by 
the loss of so many staff and records.  In any case, its capabilities are limited; the army 
was in de facto control of Aceh for 18 months prior to the disaster as it sought to crush 
the secessionist rebellion of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).  
 
The delay in reconstruction has more to do with various institutional and procedural 
bottlenecks than with the availability of funding.  In particular, the government is faced 
with two major challenges9.  The first relates to the ownership of the plan for the 
recovery (or the reconstruction) program. The national government has pointed the 
Bappenas to be the central agency for developing the recovery planning for the tsunami 
affected areas in Aceh and North Sumatra.  The main challenge for Bappenas is to make 
all agencies and organizations involved in the reconstruction process feel that they are 
equal partners/owners of the plan, although it is originally designed by the Bappenas.  So 
far, the dialog between Bappenas and local governments has been rather limited.  In the 
absence of their direct involvement, many local governments feel that they are basically 
alienated in the reconstruction process which is basically dictated by the central 
government.  Consequently, the local government may want to design their own plan and 
programs which are incompatible with the Bappenas plan, leading to duplication of 
activities and inefficient utilization of funds.   A related problem is the poor coordination 
of activities of NGOs and Bappenas.  Many NGOs have been resisting going by plans 
coming exclusively from Bappenas. Currently several consortiums of NGOs are 
developing their own reconstruction programs.  It is not yet clear how they are going to 
relate these plans to those of Bappenas or local governments. 
                                                 
9  Based on discussions with various personals in Bappenas and a discussion in the Indonesia Study Group 
in the ANU in which Daniel Fitzpatrick was the main speaker. 
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The Bappenas recovery plan has already begun to face some problems.  For instance, 
displaced people have reacted negatively to a proposal by  Bappenas to resettle them in a 
new housing complex (the tender for which has allegedly been  won by a large national 
construction company). They prefer to go back to their old properties and find some local 
solutions to rebuild their houses. Although most documents related to property have been 
lost, people are expecting that there will be a more decentralized mechanism to be able to 
reclaim their properties. Local governments and NGOs seem to support this will of local 
people. 
 
The second challenge relates to setting up an institutional mechanism for implementing 
the reconstruction plan.  The national government prefers to establish a new special 
agency to be the coordinator of the implementation of the recovery activities.  Local 
governments and NGOs are not so eager with this idea, they prefer to have a more 
decentralized mechanism in implementing the reconstruction of Aceh and some part of 
North Sumatra that they believe will be able to better accommodate local needs.  Clearly 
a strong coordination among and between governmental and non-governmental 
organizations is needed so that the implementation of the second and third phase of Aceh 
and some parts of North Sumatra will be effective and efficient.  Otherwise, each 
organizations will have their own plans and implement them in an add hoc manner.   
 
Another important challenge is to make sure that all or most commitments by 
international donors will be materialized in a timely manner.  As already discussed, some 
of the commitments may not translate into actual fund flows because of various reasons, 
which are beyond the control of Indonesia.  However, domestic aid absorption capacity 
also plays an important role. It is vital that the Indonesian government and NGOs join 
hand in maintaining effective communication with donors, and engage donors in 
developing projects/programs to minimize the mismatch between donor’s interests and 
reconstruction priorities. 
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3. Sri Lanka 
 
(a) Historical background 
Unlike Indonesia, Sri Lanka is not a disaster prone country.  Floods, and droughts are 
relatively frequent events, but the causalities have never been more than a few hundreds 
per event.  Historically earthquakes, tsunamis or other seismic disasters have been very 
rare and far between. 
 
Sri Lanka’s local tradition holds that over flow of the ocean occurred several times during 
the pre-historic times, submerging large areas of the country (Brohier 1934, Part III, 
Chapter 1). However, the first record of a ‘tsunami-like’ event10 dates back to circa 200 
BC (over 2200 ears ago), during the reign of King Kelanitissa in Maya Rata.  According 
to the Mahāwamsa (The Great Chomical of Sri Lanka) mighty waves downed whole 
villages for miles around and Kelaniya11, the seat of Kelanitissa’s principality, which lay 
twenty-five miles from the coast,  came within scant four miles (Geiger, 1953,  pp 141-
148).  According to Rājāvaliya (An Account of the Kings of Sri Lanka) one hundred 
paunagams (sea-port towns), nine hundred and seventy fisherman villages – in all, 
representing eleven-twelfths of the kingdom of Kelaniya, was overrun by sea waves 
(Suraweera 2000). 
 
Administrative records relating to the Portuguese rule of the coastal provinces of Sri 
Lanka (1594-1612) mention about an earthquake that struck the city of Colombo on 14th 
April 1615.  The earthquake, which occurred at seven o’clock on the evening of that day, 
destroyed a portion of the city wall and two hundred houses, killing over two thousand 
people (10 percent of the total population of the city).  Another earthquake occurred in 
Batticoloa (on the eastern coast of Sri Lanka) on 14 June 1814, causing only some 
property damages (Wimalaratne 2005). 
 
                                                 
10  Information provided in the chronicles is not adequate for definitive classification of this vent as a 
tsunami. 
11 Where the chronicler refers to the present day Keleniya (a citify located about 20 km southwest of 
Colombo) or a defunct city in the deep south remains controversial among the Sri Lankan historians.   
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The tsunami triggered by the eruption of the Krakatoa volcanic island in Indonesia on 27 
August 1883 was felt in a number of places on the eastern and southern coast of Sri 
Lanka.   Around 1.30 p.m. that day, the seas receded exposing the seas bed for 20 to 70 
fathoms from the shore for few minutes (as it happened during the recent tsunami) but, 
fortunately, the sea did not return in tidal waves.  The waves were only about 4 feet 
higher than the usual levels.  There were only two reported cases of death and was hardly 
any damage to property (Daily News 2005, Clarke 1957, Winchester 2003).  Presumably 
waves were not so powerful because the location of the volcanic eruption (Indonesian 
landmass itself provided a cushion against the waves) and presumably the timing of the 
event; it happened in the month of August when the seas were calmer.    
     
Over the past half a century only two important natural disasters have occurred in Sri 
Lanka.  In November 1978, a cyclone swept across the North-Eastern districts of 
Amparai, Batticaloa and Polonnariwa.   Two thousand people lost lives and nearly a 
million (7 percent of the total population) became homeless or otherwise affected in this 
disaster (Albala-Bertrand 1993, Table 3.1).   On 17 March 2003, flash floods in the 
Ratnapura district in South-Central Sri Lanka killed more than  200 people and forced an 
estimated 150,000 others to evacuate. Most of the victims were killed in a landslide that 
wiped out an entire village.   During 1975-2003, there were only 1700 deaths caused by 
natural disasters in Sri Lanka.12  
 
(b) The 26 December Killer Waves and the Tragic Aftermath 
 
‘When the Hollywood movie ‘The Day After Tomorrow’ was showing in 
Colombo last summer, many asked me if such a calamity could befall Sri 
Lanka. Without debating the scientific merits of the movie, I said that nature 
always had a few tricks up her sleeve. [However] little did I imagine that 
before the year ended, killer waves 30 feet high would lash the coast of Sri 
Lanka, leaving an unprecedented trail of destruction in my adopted country.’ 
(Sir Arthur C. Clarke, 15 January 2005) 
 
                                                 
12 Based on the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster (CRED) Database, Universite 
Catholique de Luuvin (www.em-dat.net).  
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The distance between the epicenter of the quake in Sumatra and Sri Lanka is 1500 km. At 
8.35am (Sri Lanka Time) (2 hours and 17 minutes after the eruption of the earthquake) 
the tsunami waves reached Kilinochchi (in Ampara district) in the east of Sri Lanka, and 
over 2260 km of coastline in the east and north was hit by the waves  within the next 
fifteen minutes (See Map 2).  In many areas, the walls of water were up to 10 meters high 
when they lashed against the shoreline.  In some areas waves did not exactly break, but 
rather continued inland as a fast stream of high water (like a tidal bloc) swallowing 
everything in the path; in Mullativu area in North-East Sri Lanka, the sea water column 
reportedly entered up to 5 km inland from the coast.  Given that there was no history of 
tsunami in this part of the Indian Ocean and in the absence of an early warning system, 
the killer waves took the government institutions and people completely by surprise.  In 
many coastal towns and tourists resorts, many people were reported to have watched the 
prior receding of the sea with curiosity or took the opportunity to collect stranded fish 
and thus easily succumbed to the waves which came with ferocity within 10 to 15 
minutes.  
 
Map 2 about here 
 
In Sri Lanka, as in the other countries affected by the tsunami, there has been harsh 
criticism of the failure of the government, in particular the Geological Survey and Mine 
Bureau (GSMB), to early warning system of the impending disaster.  According to the 
Director of GSMB,13 on December 19, a tremor measured less than 3.0 Richter scale was 
experienced in some parts of the country. The same day he submitted a report on these 
events to the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources.  On the D-day (26 
December), a tremor was felt in most parts of the country around 7.05 in the morning (7 
minutes after the earthquake erupted in Sumatra) and the Directors himself felt the tremor 
and altered the staff.  The Pallekele seismological station14 transmitted data at 7.06 am, 
                                                 
13 This paragraph draws upon an interview the first author had with the Director of GSMB on 5 January 
2005.    
14 In the late 1980s, the scientists in the Geological Survey and Mines Bureau (GSMB) of Sri Lanka 
became aware of some seismic changes in the Indian ocean in the neighbourhood of Sri Lanka.  There was 
evidence that the Indo-Australian plate had been splitting over a short geological time, making Sri Lanka 
vulnerable to seismic activities.  GSMB therefore took initiatives to establish a seismic monitoring system 
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but in the absence of data analysing capabilities, the GSMB staff had to wait for the 
information from the USGS.  This information arrived only around 10 am, when the 
killer waved had already done the job.  In theory, given that it took more than two hours 
for the tsunami to reach the shores of Sri Lanka, timely arrival of information would have 
saved many lives.  However, there is ample evidence from large natural disasters in other 
countries that warning processes make no sense in the absence of disaster preparedness as 
a well-rooted social arrangement (Albala-Bertrand 1993, Haque 2003).    
 
The 26 December tsunami is by far the most devastating natural catastrophe in the 
recorded history of Sri Lanka.  As of 25 February the ‘official’ death toll stood at 30,980 
with 6,300 reported as missing (most portably dead) (Table 8).  It is important to note that 
the official figures do not cover the death toll in coastal areas under the control of 
Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Elam (LTTE) that stretch from Nagakovil in the North 
down to Alampili in the district of Ampara.15  This segment of the coastal belt was the 
worst affected by the tsunami (see Map 2).  Based on anecdotal evidence from LTTE 
source, Noyalhr (2005) has estimated the unrecorded death toll in this area to be between 
32 to 35 thousands.  Women and children accounted for two thirds of the death toll, 
confirming patterns observed in various natural disasters in other parts of the world.  The 
number of children who lost both of their apparent amounted to 1,060, while 3,414 
children have lost one parent.  Around 600 foreign tourists were among the dead. 
 
Table 8 about here 
 
According to official estimates 443,000 people (approximately 2.4 percent of the total 
population the country) were displaced and between one to two million (10.5 percent) 
were directly affected by the disaster.  The North East coastal belt of the country was the 
                                                                                                                                                 
was set up in Pallekele (near Kandy) in 1999 with financial and technical support from the Scripps Institute 
of Oceanology of the University of California and the US Geological Survey (USGS).  The centre, which 
became operational in 2001, provided for recording seismic information and transmitting them to USGS 
through the head office of GSMB in Colombo (GSMB 1992).  Since the GSMB did not have capacity to 
analyze the data, it had to rely on USGS for the activity reports. 
15 The LTTE is a secessionist rebel organisation that has been fitting for an independent homeland (Elam) 
for the ethnic Tamil community in Sri Lanka.   For details on the LTTE and the ethnic conflict in Sri 
Lanka, see various contributions in Rotberg (1999) 
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worst affected. The percentage of coastal population affected ranges from an estimated 
35 percent in Kilinochi to 80 percent in Mutative and 78 percent in Asmara coastal 
divisions compared to the southern districts of Galle, Matara and Hambantotata where 
less than 20 percent of the population was affected, albeit with scattered pockets of 
severe damaged (ADB, JBIC and World Bank 2005).  The tsunami waves largely missed 
major urban areas and important industrial assets.  Port of Colombo and its infrastructure 
was not affected, apart from some minor damages to a few container ships.     
 One notable surprise that came out of the tsunami disaster was the power of ‘animal 
spirit’.  The Yala National Park located in the south-eastern coast of Sri Lanka was one of 
the areas badly hit by the killer waves.  Over two hundred bodies of tourists and locals 
were found in the park during rescue operations, but wildlife officials were unable to find 
the body of a single animal (Sunday Leader (Colombo), 2 January 2005, 23).  This 
evidence is consistent with the emerging view among the seismologists that the study  of 
animal behaviour in a systematic way (in combination with other ancillary data) could 
provide useful early warning of an impending natural disaster. 
 
The disaster holds important lessons in the area of coastal resource management (Clarke 
2005).  Since the beginning of the 20th century, there has been a rule that regulates any 
construction within 300 meters of the shore.  For a long time, this rule has been ignored 
or openly flouted by individuals as well as hotel developers and shrimp farmers.  
Moreover, there has been gross violation of regulations prohibiting mining coral reefs 
and destroying coastal mangrove forests, which act as splendid bulwarks against the 
wrath of the sea.  Mining was not the only threat to the reef.  Fishermen use dynamite to 
stun and catch fish, blowing up everything for meters around.  This illegal activity has 
continued over the years, wrecking the reef.  There is clear evidence that thousands of 
lives could have been saved if the right action had been taken at the right time to enforce 
these regulations; the damage has been much greater in areas where the incidence of 
violation of environmental regulations was greater (Clarke 2005).  In the aftermath of the 
tsunami, environmentalists and divers from across South and Southeast Asia have 
reported similar examples. For instance, mangroves in southern India’s Pitchavaram and 
Muthupet regions acted like a shield and bore the brunt of the tsunami, protecting around 
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1700 people living in hamlets built inside between 100 to 1000 meters from the 
mangroves (www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2005/89119).  As already noted, the death 
toll in the island of Simeuleu in Indonesia was relatively low, partly due to mangrove 
forests that surrounded the island.  By contrast, uprooting or snapping off at mid-trunk of 
mangroves caused extensive property damage in Thailand.16
 
(c )  Economic impact 
The overall damage to the economy has been estimated at around US$ 1 billion (4.5 
percent of GDP).17  Total financial needs for reconstruction are estimated to be around 
US$1.5 to 1.6 billion (Table 9).   
 
Table 9 about here 
 
The immediate effect of the disaster on growth performance of the economy is likely to 
be small mainly because the destruction was largely confined to the southern and eastern 
provinces.  The Central Bank is predicting that GDP growth will drop from a predicted 6 
percent to around 5.5 percent in 2005.  The IMF and the ADB have however cut their 
growth forecast for 2005 by a greater magnitude, from 5 percent to 4 percent, and 5.6 
percent to 4.2 percent respectively.  These estimates are based on the available estimates 
of the direct contribution of the affected regions to the overall national output of the 
economy. These output losses are likely to be offset to a considerable extent by higher 
investment growth as reconstruction of the physical capital stock in effected areas 
commence.  A sharp pick up in fixed investment growth (18 percent compared to a pre-
tsunami forecast of 8.5 percent) and a modest increase in government consumption is 
predicted in 2005 (ADB, JBIC and World Bank 2005). 
 
Tourism and fishing, the two main economic sectors of the tsunami affected areas, have 
suffered massively.  These sectors accounted for only 2.2 percent and 1.7 percent of GDP 
in 2003.   More than 80 percent of the Island’s fishing fleet was wiped out and more than 
14,000 fishermen were killed by the tsunami.  Approximately 30 percent of the room 
                                                 
16 www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2005/89119
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capacity of tourist hotel was damaged.  The tourist industry, with approximately 30 
percent of room capacity damaged, will take some time to recover.  About three forth of 
the rooms were back in operation by the end of February, but a sharp drop in occupancy 
levels is expected because of inadequate infrastructure.  Among other economic 
activities, even in the coastal areas of Ampara and Baticcaloa, the rice crop was not badly 
affected. However, heavy loss of life along the coastal belt would lead to severe 
manpower shortages that could impede harvesting operations.  There will be adverse 
implications for insurance and banking industry.  The industry’s profitability for 2005 is 
likely to be materially impaired on account of potential write-offs and provisions against 
bad loans that would arise as a result of the damage.  Although loans extended to the 
affected regions amount only to between 5 percent to 10 percent of total loans in the case 
of the large banks. However, loss to the banks on account of directly affected borrowers 
would be significant given the significant damage to underlying collaterals such as real 
state and stocks in trade which would have normally mitigated the losses of faced by the 
banks.  The non-bank financial sector, comprising of leasing companies and finance 
companies, As with banks, the exposure of non-bank financial institutions to the affected 
areas is low, but losses on affected borrowers could be high, as vehicles in Sri Lanka 
were typically not covered for perils such as tsunamis or earthquakes.   
 
According to estimates by the IMF the current account deficit of Sri Lanka would 
widened from US$ 2.28 billion in 2004 to US$ 2.69 billion in 2005.  Although major 
export sector – textiles and garments – have not been affected, tourism earnings (which 
account for about 7 percent of total current account receipts) were expected to fall by 
about 15 percent compared to 2004.  Imports related to reconstruction activities are 
expected be reflected in 3 percent increase in the import bill.  However, the aid inflows 
(provided of course the pledges are honored by the donor countries) would be more than 
sufficient to counterbalance these adverse developments and to generate a modest overall 
surplus in the balance of payments.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 These figures do not cover assets losses in the informal sector. 
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The indications are that adverse economic impact of the disaster will result in a 
significant increase in the incidence of poverty.  The affected provinces (South and South 
East) contribute to about 17.5 percent of GDP but account for a larger proportion of the 
population (26 percent).  The per capital GDP in these provinces is estimated at about 
US$640, compared to the national average of US$930 and about US$1500 in the Western 
province.  Moreover, in the affected regions vulnerable groups, such as fishermen living 
close to the shore in simple houses and shelters and those who make a living by engaging 
in informal sector activities evolved around tourism have borne the brunt of the negative 
impact, in conformity with universal patterns of ‘the life and death arithmetics’ of 
disasters world over (Sachs 2005).  The ADB predicts that the tsunami’s immediate and 
lingering effects would throw some 250,000 people below the poverty line.  This implies 
an increase in the overall head-count rate of poverty in Sri Lanka from the present level 
of 22.7 percent (World Bank 2004) to 25 percent.     
 
(c) Disaster management 
The first phase of disaster management has gone smoothly.  At the beginning, there was 
fear that the outbreak of disease could cause significant economic disruption.  This fear 
never materialized (WHO 2005).  No outbreaks of epidemics or unusual cluster of 
communicable diseases has been reported, other than a few sporadic cases of diarrhea and 
acute respiratory infections.  There is little evidence about problems related to rescue 
operations in the areas controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE).  
Rescue missions returning from the area, however, attested to the effectiveness of the 
organized response initiated by the LTTE immediately after the tsunami hit the coastline 
under their control.  As other grass-root political organizations, LTTE has well organized 
structures, mechanisms and trained personnel to respond to humanitarian emergencies.  
 
At the time of the tsunami, macroeconomic conditions of the economy were precarious.  
The government was running a budget deficit of over 8 percent of GDP.18  Public debts 
amounted to over 100 percent of GDP.  The newly elected government was relying 
predominantly on the Central Bank (printing money) to implement its costly election 
                                                 
18 Data reported in this paragraph are from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report (various issues). 
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promises. On the external front, external debt stock amounted to US$11bn (57 percent of 
2004 GDP).  The oil price escalation had resulted in a widening of the current account 
deficit from 3 percent of GDP in 2003 to 3.7 percent in 2004.  The debt service ratio had 
remained in the range of 13.2 – 15.2 percent cent for the past five years.  Public external 
debt service payments accented for over two thirds of total debt service payments of the 
country by the 2004.  The IMF and the World Bank had suspended some of the 
previously approved credit line pending the demonstration of its economic credentials by 
the new government which had come into power by promising to implement a ‘national 
development policy’ without relying on the Bretton Woods institutions.  Under these 
circumstance, there was little degree of freedom for the government to manage the 
unanticipated devastation and rebuilt the economy on its own.   
 
The response of the international community was swift and remarkable.  Total aid 
pledges to Sri Lanka had passed the 1.5 billion mark by mid-January, exceeding the 
amount of the tentative reconstruction budget.  In addition, on January 13, the IMF 
approved the granting to Sri Lanka of a freeze on repayments in 2005 of some 113.5 
million dollars in debt.  The IMF also provided Sri Lanka with access to emergency 
funding totaling 160 million dollars.  The ADB allocated a sum of US$200 million for Sri 
Lanka for rehabilitation work.  Debt rescheduling by the Paris Club donors also 
strengthened both the government financial position and the external payment position 
because government debts accounted for the bulk of total external debts of the country.    
 
Notwithstanding the improved financial position of the country, the task of disaster 
management has become more complex when it moved beyond the immediate, 
humanitarian rescue/relief stage into the reconstruction/rebuilding stage.  It remains to be 
seen whether the government can overcome its usual very slow pace in project 
implementation; for the past decade or so the annual rare of absorption of foreign aid in 
Sri Lanka has varied in the range of 40 percent to 45 percent.   So far the progress has 
been rather slow.  By mid-May, more than 75 percent of the displaced people were still 
living in rehabilitation camps and/or with friends and relatives.   Unlike in Aceh, there 
has been rapid progress in clearing major roads and restoring public utilities. However, 
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the major reconstruction/rebuilding projects were still at the planning stage (ADB 2005). 
The rescue/rehabilitation phase has gone smoothly because the objectives were straight 
forward and individuals co-operative behaviour did not leave much room for ideological 
differences.   However, unfortunately domestic politics has come to the fore in the 
reconstruction process, which essentially involves multiple objectives and conflicts of 
interests in resource allocation.   Delay in government action had begun to act as a major 
deterrent to rehabilitation and reconstruction carried out by affected individuals 
themselves, NGOs and other civil-society organizations.   
 
The proposed regulations for reconstruction (to be implemented through the Urban 
Development Authority and the Coast Conservation Department) include a ban on the 
construction of dwellings within 100 meters from the beach.  Implementation of this 
coastal buffer zone legislation has already come under pressure.  The displaced fishermen 
who were previously living within the zone demand that they be given houses built on the 
immediate adjacent stretch of land.  Their worry is the safety of their boats and easy 
access to the sea.   The hotel industry is concerned about the adverse implications of the 
buffer zone on its construction plans; over 10 beach hotel projects in the South West 
Coast worth US$ 30 million are said to be on hold due to this restriction.   The buffer 
zone proposal soon turned out to be a major stumbling book in the implementation of the 
resettlement program as the major opposition party (the United National Party) sided with 
the protestors.     
 
The role of government in the resettlement of affected families has become a 
controversial issue.  The UNP is of the view that the rehabilitation initiatives should be 
aimed at putting resources into peoples hands and letting them decide how best to 
proceed.  However, the government is planning to play a major role in the reconstruction 
of house for the displaced people for two main reasons.  First, this would enable effective 
implementation of the buffer zone legislation. Secondly, many displaced families (in 
particular, those living in more densely populated affected areas) do not have clear titles 
to their land, a problem which has become enormously complicated by the large loss of 
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life in these areas.  For many of these families, it will be difficult to rebuild on their own, 
even if funds are made readily available. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that the tsunami disaster occurred in Sri Lanka against the 
backdrop of a long-standing ethno-political conflict and the and at a time when the 
negotiation process to end it though political means was under severe stress.  Disaster 
management in Sri Lanka, therefore, involves interesting and possibly unsettling political 
dimensions.  In the wake of the disaster, there were hopes among policy/political circles 
that the tsunami devastation it would present an opportunity for cooperation between the 
government and the LTTE.  This was particularly so because much of the devastation 
took place in the Eastern province, the power base of the LTTE.  The tsunami destroyed 
the bulk of assets and personnel of the LTTE navel force (The Sea Tigers) and, in relative 
terms, the overall death toll and economic destruction was much larger in the LTTE-
dominated east, compared to the rest of the country.  However, these hopes were soon 
dashed as the government and the international aid community failed to draw up a 
conflict-sensitive disaster management strategy involving the LTTE as an equal partner.19  
The government soon came under accusation by the LTTE (as well as the Muslim 
community in the East) of overly focusing it relief efforts in the south of the country 
(where the majority Sinhalese population live).  The LTTE sees the Eastern provinces as 
the territory under its control, and naturally would not like to see the government 
improving its popularity among the local population.  The success of reconstruction 
process depends crucially on the ability of the government to ensure that its fragile 
relations with the LTTE do not erupt into renewed conflict.     
 
The ability of the government to get the LTTE involved as an equal partner in the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction process has been severely constrained by it weak power 
base.  The People’s Alliance (PA) government of Chandrika Kumaranatunga is a loose 
coalition of seven parties of varying political shade.  The ‘Marxist-nationalist’ Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the largest ally of Kumaranatunga’s party (Sri Lanka 
                                                 
19 The government lost an important opportunity for reconciliation when Kofi Annan, who visited Sri 
Lanka in early January, was refused permission to visit LTTE-held areas.  
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Freedom Party, SPF) in the coalition is a strong opponent of any form of devolution of 
power to the LTTE.  The JVP has set up its own relief fund and has seemingly strengthen 
its tradition support base in the south of the country thorough highly efficient, grass-root-
level rescue/rehabilitation work in the aftermaths of the tsunami.  Recently, it threatened 
to topple the government in the event of any move by the President in favour of 
accommodating LTTE demands. To make matters worse, relations between the 
administration of Kumaranatunga and the opposition United national Party (UNP) have 
been very poor in recent months.  The relations seem to have further weakened after 
President Kumaranatunga’s off-the-cup statement in mid February (which she 
subsequently withdrew) that, for the sake of smooth implementation of the reconstruction 
program, she would remain in power for five more years. 
 
As the reconstruction process involves massive investment in non-tradable activities, 
allocation of government funds need to be managed carefully to avoid jeopardizing 
macroeconomic instability. Macroeconomic management in the reconstruction phase 
become even more complicated when a country rely on massive aid inflows to finance 
these activities.  With massive capital inflows the possibility of an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate with adverse implications for the traded goods sectors (export producing 
and import competing sectors) of the economy cannot be ruled, out unless the inflow of 
capital in managed in an orderly fashion.  
 
The exchange rate of the Sri Lanka Rupee (SLR) (which has been under a highly flexible, 
managed floating regime since 2001) began to appreciate as aid commitments began to 
mount, even before substantial about of these pledges begun to translate into actual 
inflows.  The SKL/US$ rate which stood at 105 on 20 December 2004 declined 
persistently to about 95 by mid-January (Figure 2).  Initially the Central Bank resisted 
foreign exchange market intervention despite recurrent demand by the exporters.  
However, from about the third week of January it has begun to ‘lean against the wind’ to 
stabilize the exchange rate.  It seems that the Central bank intervention has been useful in 
stabilizing the currency in nominal terms; from about the late February it has lightly 
recovered and remained in the narrow range of 99.3 to 99.7.  However, it is too early to 
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assess the implications of capital inflows for the movement of the real exchange rate.  
There would be pressure for the real exchange appreciation when the expenditure effects 
of the reconstruction process begin to impact on domestic non-tradable prices.  On the 
other hand, the actual aid flows may fall short of the initial pledges, defying the initial 
optimism of the foreign exchange market participants and reducing this pressure.  There 
are two main reasons for a shortfall of actual aid flows from the amount of total pledges.  
First, evident from previous humanitarian crises suggests that some of the pledges simply 
take the form of ‘face-saving’ commitments, which simply lead to subsequent reshuffling 
of the aid portfolio while keeping total aid to the given country by an large unchanged.   
Second, even if we consider all pledges as genuine, whether they would be translated into 
actual aid flows depends crucially on the aid absorption capacity of the given country.     
 
Figure 2 about here 
  
5. Concluding Remarks  
A simple but important lesson from the experience in Sri Lanka and Indonesia (and the 
other tsunami-affected countries in the region) in the 26 December tsunami disaster is the 
need to educate the population about simple precautions that would save lives during 
tsunami (and other national disasters).  For instance clear prior understanding by the 
public of a receding sea as an early warning of impending killer waves would have saved 
thousands of lives.  The case for improving public awareness an integral part of the 
school education system is particularly strong in Indonesia where, according to the 
information harnessed in this paper, both the frequency and the severity of natural 
disasters has been on the increase over time.  
 
The tsunami disaster holds important lessons in the area of coastal resource management.  
There is evidence that thousands of lives could have been saved if the right action had 
been taken at the right time to enforce environmental regulations to perverse coral reefs 
and mangroves, which effectively act as a buffer against killer waves.   There is a clear 
need for systematic analysis of the link between violation of environmental regulation 
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and the severity of the destruction caused by the killer waves in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and 
other tsunami-affected countries in order to drive home this message. 
 
An immediate reaction to the tsunami calamity has been to call for action by individual 
countries as well as at the regional level to set up early warning systems. This is 
proposition certainly deserves serious attention.  However, to be effective any early 
warning system needs to be implemented as part of a carefully designed disaster 
management program.  As the Sri Lankan experience with the seismic monitoring centre 
established with the assistance of the University of California and the US Geological 
Survey vividly demonstrated the mere acquisition of hardware would not do the job.  
Scientists to operate the system need to be trained and there has to be a firm political 
commitment for the smooth implementation of the project.  More importantly, there is 
ample evidence coming from disaster situations in other countries that disaster prediction 
make no sense in the absence of disaster preparedness as a social arrangement, achieved, 
among other means, through proper education and training and though an extensive 
media campaign.  
  
The evidence from Indonesia and Sri Lanka reconfirms evidence coming from previous 
disaster situations in other countries that the poor bear the brunt of the calamity. This 
evidence makes a strong case for placing emphasis on policies and programs for 
cushioning the poor against natural disaster as an integral part of national development 
strategy.  For disaster prone countries such as Indonesia, there is a clear need for setting 
up an institutional mechanism, backed by a central disaster management fund, with 
capacity to engage swiftly in rescue and initial rehabilitation operations following a 
disaster. To be effective such institutional mechanisms/procedures could be developed in 
such a way as to maintain operational links with national and international NGOs, other 
charitable organizations and various UN organizations involved in disaster management. 
 
The Sri Lankan and Indonesian disaster management records over the past five months 
clearly demonstrate that mere availability of funds does not guarantee speedy 
implementations of reconstruction/rebuilding programs. Effective absorption of aid 
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depends crucially on the ability of the authorities of the affected country to engage local 
communities, local governments, NGOs and international donor agencies both in the 
planning and implementation processes. This is going to be a daunting task particularly if 
the disaster occurs in a country/area suffering from a deep-rooted ethno-political conflict 
such as Aceh and east Sri Lanka.  Jading by the experiences of various disaster situations 
in other countries, some of the commitments may not translate into actual fund flows 
because of various reasons beyond the control of the affected country. Nevertheless, 
engaging donors in developing projects/programs to minimize the mismatch between 
donor’s interests and reconstruction priorities is vital for maximizing national gains from 
the generosity of international donors.   The international donor community also should 
give serious consideration to designing innovative strategies for improving aid 
effectiveness in specific disaster situations.   
 
Finally, Sri Lanka’s post-tsunami experience seems to hold important lessons for 
macroeconomic management in the reconstruction phase when the disaster-affected 
country relies on massive aid inflows. With massive capital inflows, there is the 
possibility of exchange rate appreciation with adverse implications for the traded goods 
sectors (export producing and import competing sectors), unless the inflow of capital in 
managed in an orderly fashion.   
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Table 1:  The Tsunami Devastation: Summary data (circa end of February 2005) 
 
 Areas affected Damage Displaced Deaths Missing people 
India 2200 km of coastal 
land; 300m to 3 km 
inland and 3 million 
people 
897 villages, 157,393 dwelling units, 
11,827 ha of cropped area, 
US$1.56bn assets 
647,556  10872 5551 
Indonesia Aceh, 14 out of 21 
districts; 1 million 
people 
172 sub-districts, 1550 villages, and 
21659 houses 
811409   166,760 127,749
Malaysia North West states of 
Penang and Kedah 
    8000 68 6
Maldives     20 attols 100000 people 10578 82 26
Myanmar 23 villages 592 houses of 17 villages  2591 At least 
2500* 
--- 
Sri Lanka 1720km of coastal 
land; 300m to 3. km 
inland, 103 families.  
78,529 fully damaged houses; 41097 
partly damaged houses 
502668   30959 5644
Thailand 6 provinces on the 
west coast 
6.85m baht have been provided to 
assist victims 
---   5392 3100
Somalia Puntland region worst 
hit, 650 km coast line 
600 families have lost properties. 
2600 fishing boats destroyed 
4000  At least
150 
 NA 
 
Source: WTO (2005) and Economist (2005c) (for data on deaths in Myanmar). 
 
Note: 
*  Estimated deaths in Phang Nga province, which took the biggest hit on  26th December, 2004. 
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Table 2:   Aid Commitments to Tsunami Affected Countries, as of 21-February 2005 (US$ million)1 
  India Indonesia Sri Lanka Thailand Myanmar Maldives Malaysia Somalia Multilateral Total  
Australia   399.3 2.4           29 430.7 
Austria                 69.2 69.2 
Belgium   2.3 2.3     0.08     11.5 16.2 
Brunei Darussalam                 3.7 3.7 
Canada   2.3 0.4     1.9     346.2 350.8 
China   0.7 1   0.2 0.1     62.2 64.2 
Czech Republic   0.2 0.5           9.9 10.6 
Denmark 0.1 13.5 11.1     0.02 0.03   53.3 78 
Finland   1.4             67.8 69.2 
France   1.8 0.8     0.03     440.1 442.7 
Germany 0.8 19.2 20.8     1.3   0.1 624.1 666.3 
Greece   10.1 7.5 0.6   0.7     7.6 26.5 
Iran                 5 5 
Ireland 1.2 0.4 1.3 0.03         10.4 13.3 
Italy   4.3 14.5           94.1 112.9 
Japan   200.5 101.7 0.1   25.4     173.6 501.3 
Korea (Republic of)   0.5 0.4 0.1   0.05 0.05   49.5 50.6 
Kuwait                 100 100 
Luxemburg     0.4           6.5 6.9 
Malaysia 0.5 3.4 0.5     0.1     1.3 5.8 
Malta     10.9             10.9 
Netherlands   14.3 8.7           243.6 266.6 
New Zealand   14.7 0.3     2.9 0.03   27.6 45.5 
Norway 0.3          8.6 6.9 0.01 0.2   1.7 154.7 172.4
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Portugal   5.6 4.4 0.02         6.2 16.2 
Qatar                 25 25 
Russian Federation                 32.2 32.2 
Saudi Arabia (Kingdom 
of) 
0.2            2.5 1.5 1 0.7 0.1 157.5 163.5
Singapore                 13.7 13.7 
Spain     1.3           70.3 71.6 
Sweden 0.7 7.5 2.3 0.05       0.3 66 76.9 
Switzerland 0.4 15.5 8.9 1   0.1     17.9 43.8 
Turkey            2.9 1.3 0.5 0.06 0.3 0.3 0.1 0 5.5
UK 2.7 21.5 9.6     1   1 84.4 120.2 
US            4.1 38.2 62.4 0.3 1.6 0.05 1 245.7 353.4
Other countries           0.1 0.6 0.3 0.1 0 0 0 0 4.3 30.1
                      
Organization           16.55 11.4 0.05 0 2.8 0.05 0 1726.3 1757.2
FAO   0.4 0.4     0.3     0.4 1.5 
UNDP                 2.3 2.3 
UNEP                 1 1 
American Red Cross                 50 50 
Arab Gulf Fund                 0.1 0.1 
Asian Development Bank                 600 600 
Disasters Emergency 
Committee (UK) 
                191.6 191.6 
European Commission                 610.6 610.6 
European Commission 
EuropeAid Co-operation 
Office 
                19 19 
European Commission   14 10.4 0   2.4     4.3 31.1 
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Humanitarian Aid Office 
ROLEX                 1 1 
UNICEF NATCOMs                 241.2 241.2 
United Nations Fund for 
International Partnerships 
  1.7             1.5 3.2 
 Other    0.5 0.6 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 3.3 4.6 
                      
Private5   0.2 1     0.5     60.9 62.6 
Total           11.1 810.5 322.3 6.4 0.26 39.9 0.53 4.2 5122.3 6317.5
Source: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, www.releifwb.int/fts.
 
Notes: 
1.   Data do not cover donations in kind (eg  provided emergency shelter and household items World Vision).  Only the countries/organization 
with commitments of more than US 5 million are separately listed. 
2.   Commitments made directly to individual tsunami affected countries.  
3.  Commitments made to multilateral relief organizations (such as UNICEF, WHO, WHO, ILO, FAO and WFO, Red Cross) and to NGOs.  
4. Allocation of unmarked funds 
5. Covers only contribution to governments and multilateral relief organizations.   According to some estimates total private donations amounted 
to more than US$ 1.5 billion (Economists 2005d). 
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Table 3. Natural Disasters in Indonesia 1907-2004* 
No. of Total  
Events 
Killed 
(person) 
Injured 
(person) 
Homeless(person) Affected 
(person) Affected 
(person) 
Damage 
(US$ ‘000) 
Drought 11      9,329 --- --- 4,894,220 4,894,220 159,200 
Earthquake 78       21,856 21,327 284,605 1,418,006 1,723,938 801,219
Epidemic** 30  3,476 --- --- 653,468 653,468 --- 
Famine 3      260 --- --- 162,000 162,000 ---
Flood 93      4,296 250,761 201,735 4,616,810 5,069,306 532,090
Slides 30    1,615 443 29,555 339,337 369,335 20,039
Volcano 43       17,945 3,280 17,500 961,073 981,853 344,390
Wave / Surge 7      243,664 120 412,438 2,000 414,558 675,000
Wild Fires 7   63 208 --- 3,034,000 3,034,208 17,235,000
Wind Storm 10    1,992 183 800 18,715 19,698 --- 
TOTAL 312 304,496 276,322 946,633 16,099,629 17,322,584 19,766,938
Average per 
event 
 976 886 3,034 51,601 55,521 63,356 
Source: the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster (CRED) Database, Universite Catholique de Luuvin (www.em-
dat.net) 
 
Notes:   
---  data not available. 
*   Including the earthquake and tsunami in Aceh on the 26th December 2004 
**  Epidemics included: Plague(Bubonic), Diarrhoeal/Enteric(Cholera), Malaria, Diarrhoeal/Enteric, Arbovirus(Dengue fever), Anthrax, 
Diarrhoeal/Enteric(Acute diarrhoeal syndrome), Rabies, Diarrhoeal/Enteric(Shigella suspected), Respiratory(Acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)), 
Arbovirus(Dengue). 
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Table 4:  Natural Disasters in Indonesia 1997-2004* 
 
Disaster No. of Total Affected Total Estimated Destroyed 
  Events Killed Refugee Losses Houses
    (person) (person) (million rupiah.)(unit) 
Epidemic   22 304 --- --- ---
Vulcano Eruption 45 8 39,484 --- 5 
Tsunami 23   22,170 1,592 1,085 588
Earthquake     52 7,574 17,774 798,064 17,501
Cyclone 136     5,047 3,328 81,380 7,313
Earthslide      219 435 8,231 31,286 2,908
Flood    299 285 390,356 888,476 39,393
TOTAL   796 36,986 462,116 1,816,427 68,137
   average per event  46 581 2,282 86 
 
Source: Indonesian Emergency Relief Coordination Agency (http://www.bakornaspbp.go.id/) 
Notes 
---  data not available. 
* Excluding the earthquake and tsunami in Aceh on the 26th December 2004 
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Table 5:   Indonesia: Number of People Affected by the Aceh Tsunami 
 
Region Population Killeda Lostb Hospitalizedb Refugeeb Affected
people 
Affected/Population
(%) 
Aceh Province        
01. Kota Banda Aceh 269,091 78,417 64,552 --- 39,509 182,478 67.8 
02. Kab. Aceh Besar 306,718 58 43,902 --- 97,947 141,907 46.3 
03. Kota Sabang 27,447 18 108 --- 4,403 4,529 16.5 
04. Kab. Pidie 517,452       4,646 2,091 --- 64,613 71,350 13.8
05. Kab. Bireun 350,964 1,488 58 187 15,546 17,279 4.9 
06. Kab. Aceh Utara 395,800 2,217 233 284 20,082 22,816 5.8 
07. Kota Lhokseumawe 156,478 394 11 75 20,084 20,564 13.1 
08. Kab. Aceh Timur 253,151 224 --- --- 13,710 13,934 5.5 
09. Kota Langsa 141,138 --- --- --- 10,370 10,370 7.3 
10. Kab. Aceh Tamiang 238,718 --- --- --- 3,100 3,100 1.3 
11. Kab. Aceh Jaya 111,671 19,661 77 --- 40,382 60,120 53.8 
12. Kab. Aceh Barat 97,523 11,830 2,911 --- 78,817 93,558 95.9 
13. Kab. Nagan Raya 152,748 493 865 --- 14,769 16,127 10.6 
14. Kab. Aceh Barat Daya 153,411 835 --- --- 13,964 14,799 9.6 
15. Kab. Aceh Selatan 167,052 6 1,086 10 16,188 17,290 10.4 
16. Kab. Simeuleu 76,629 22 1 135 18,009 18,167 23.7 
17. Kab. Aceh Singkil 174,007 73 4 --- 106 183 0.1 
18. Kab. Aceh Tengah 158,641 192 227 229 4,005 4,653 2.9 
19. Kab. Aceh Tenggara 168,034 26 --- --- --- 26 --- 
20. Kab. Gayo Lues 67,514 27 --- --- --- 27 --- 
21. Kab. Bener Meriah 120,000 36 --- --- 1,204 1,240 1.0 
        
Total Aceh        4,104,187 120,663 116,126 920 476,808 714,517 17.4
        
North Sumatra 
Provincec
       
01. Kab. Nias 422,170 233 24 --- 4,000 4,257 1.0% 
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02. Kab. Nias Selatan 275,422 1 --- --- n.a. 1 0.0% 
03. Kab. Tapanuli Tengah 272,333 1 --- --- n.a. 1 0.0% 
04. Kab. Serdang Bedagai 549,091 4 --- 2 n.a. 6 0.0% 
05. Kab. Mandailing 
Natal 
369,691       1 --- --- n.a. 1 0.0%
        
Total North Sumatra 1,888,707 240     24 2 4,000 4,266 0.2% 
        
In Medan       --- --- --- 2,509 18,342 20,851 ---
In Jakarta        --- --- --- --- 1,567 1,567 ---
Total     5,992,894 120,903 116,150 3,431 500,717 741,201 12.4% 
Notes: 
a = Bakornas PBP on 31 January 2005 
b = Dep. Social on 17 February 2005 
c = These are not all the provinces in North Sumatra; only affected districts 
---  data not available 
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Table 6. Indonesia: Estimated Damages and Losses 
 Total Impact Property 
 Damage Losses   Total Private Public
Social Sectors   1674.9 65.8 1740.7 1440.6 300.1 
   Housing 1398.3 38.8 1437.1 1408.4 28.7 
   Education 110.8 17.6 128.4 9 119.4 
   Health 82.5 9.4 91.9 23.2 68.6 
   Culture and Religion 83.4  83.4  83.4 
Infrastructure 636     240.8 876.8 325.9 550.8
   Transport 390.5 145.4 535.9 165.8 370.1 
   Communications 18.9 2.9 21.8 8.6 13.2 
   Energy 67.8 0.1 67.9 1.1 66.9 
   Water and Sanitation 26.6 3.2 29.8 18.3 11.4 
   Flood control, irrigation and sea 
protection works 132.1     89.1 221.2 132.1 89.1
Productive Sectors 351.9 830.2 1182.1 1132 50.1 
   Agriculture and Livestock 83.9 140.9 224.8 194.7 29.9 
   Fisheries 101.5 409.4 510.9 508.5 2.5 
   Enterprises 166.6 280 446.6 428.9 17.7 
Cross Sectoral     257.6 394.4 652 562.9 89.1
   Environment 154.5  154.5 548.9  
   Governance and administration 89.1  89.1  89.1 
   Bank and Finance 14  14 14  
Total Impact 2920.4     1531.2 4451.6 3461.4 990.1
Source: World Bank (2005) 
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Table 7: Indonesia: Estimated Damages  
as Percentage of Pre-disaster Levels 
 Items Damages in
Percentage 
  
Road  31.7
School  30.0
Hospital  33.3
Health Centre 24.0 
Permanent House 26.9 
Non-Permanent House 30.4 
Irrigated Paddy Field 24.9 
Non-irrigated Paddy Field 32.4 
Estate Crop 27.9 
Community Forest 28.3 
Non-Oil/Gas Industry 27.4 
Source: LPEM (2005). 
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Table 8: Sri Lanka: Impact of Tsunami (as at 25 January) 
Displaced persons Impact on property Province   District No of
affected 
families 
No of 
displaced 
families 
In 
welfare 
centers 
With 
relatives 
Total 
Number 
of death 
Number 
of 
missing 
people 
No. of 
completely 
damaged 
houses 
No of 
partly 
damaged 
houses 
North         Jaffna 13652 12631 11891 28016 39907 2640 540 6084 1114 
 Killinochchi 2295 318      305 1298 1603 560 1 1250 4250
        Mulativ --- 6007 11993 10564 22557 3000 552 3400 600 
Eastern           Trincomalee --- 27494 19559 62084 81643 1078 337 5974 10394
 Baticaloa 63717        12494 30403 31509 61912 2840 1033 15939 5665 
      Ampara 38624 --- 75172 --- 75172 10436 876 29077 ---
Southern        Hambantota 16994 3334 555 17168 17723 4500 963 2303 1744
 Matara 20675 3268    4141 9254 13395 1342 613 2362 5659
      Galle 23174 1472 4830 123247 128077 4216 554 5525 5966
Western Kalutara         6905 6905 3281 24432 27713 256 155 2780 3116
 Colombo      9647 5290 5999 25240 31239 79 12 3398 2210
        Gampaha 6827 308 876 573 1449 6 5 292 307
North 
Western 
Putlam         232 18 66  66 4 3 23 72
Total 202742         79791 169071 333385 502456 30957 5644 78407 41097
Source: Sri Lanka, Department of Census and  Statistics <www.statistics.gov.lk/tsunami/index.htm> 
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Table 9: Sri Lanka: Preliminary Estimates of Asset Losses due to Tsunami and Financial Needs 
for Reconstruction 
 
Sector Asset losses Reconstruction needs 
  Short term Medium 
term 
Total 
Housing 360-341 50 387-437 437-487 
Roads 60 25 175 200 
Water and sanitation 42 64 53 117 
Railway 15 40 90 130 
Education 26 13 32 45 
Health 60 17 67 84 
Agriculture 3 2 2 4 
Fisheries 97 69 49 118 
Tourism 250 130  130 
Power 10 27 40-50 67-77 
Environment 10 6 12 18 
Social welfare  30  30 
Miscellaneous and 
contingency expenses 
90 30 120 150 
Total, US$ million 970-1000 500 1000-1100 1500-1600 
Percent of GDP 4.4 – 4.6   7.0-7.3 
 
Source: ADB, JBIC and World Bank (2005) 
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Figure 1. Indonesia: Earthquakes above 5 on Richter scale, 1007 - 2005 
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Source: USGS (2005) 
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Figure 2:   US dollar – Sri Lankan Rupee Daily Exchange Rate*, 12 December 2004 – 6 
April 2005  
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* Commercial bank middle rate (average of buying and selling rates) for transaction with 
customers 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, http://www.lanka.net/centralbank/dailyexch.htm1 
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Map 1: Indian Ocean Earthquake/Tsunami Disaster Area 
 
 
Source:   Economist 2005b 
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Map  2: Sri Lanka:  Tsunami Disaster Areas 
 
 
Source : Department of Census and Statistics, Colombo 
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